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Department of Social Work and
Community Development
This article examines how and why five major stakeholders-in-
ternationalfinancial organizations; NGOs; governmental entities;
multinational corporations; and community development proj-
ects-have failed to significantly and uniformly reduce aggregate
global poverty. The article uses the results of a case study of HIV/
AIDS prevention in a low-income Nigerian city to argue that ef-
fective action must involve local and global stakeholders in collab-
orative partnerships. It concludes by discussing the critical role of
facilitators in such partnerships.
Keywords: global economy, community development, NGO,
INGO, World Bank, IMF, WTO.
Globalization is best understood in relative terms since all
countries are not impacted equally. For the world's desper-
ately poor, sweatshops and other exploitive workplaces can
seem more like opportunity than exploitation. For others in the
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developed (and developing) world, globalization has meant
untold prosperity. While the edifices of capitalist develop-
ment-megacities, posh hotels and skyscrapers-are growing,
poverty rates in developed countries are either frozen or rising,
housing costs are becoming unmanageable, and the prices
of goods and services are rising faster than wages which is
leading to unsustainable levels of personal debt (Karger, 2005).
Like Russian dolls, industrial societies are resembling a nation
within a nation within a nation. This article will investigate
how these forces are shaping policies in the developing world.
It will also examine how effective development requires collab-
orative partnerships by which local people can regain control
of development.
Major International Financial Organizations
Numerous international financial organizations, United
Nations funds, and private donors are trying to address global
poverty and development. However, an economy of space dic-
tates that this section only focuses only on the largest financial
organizations.
In 1944 delegates from 45 nations gathered at the United
Nations Monetary and Financial Conference in Bretton Woods,
New Hampshire to discuss Europe's shattered economy.
Delegates reached a consensus that established a postwar
economy around currency exchange rates and free trade. The
Conference created the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(World Bank), and the International Trade Organization (ITO)
which the U.S. Congress refused to ratify. Instead, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed in 1947;
in 1995 GATT became the World Trade Organization (WTO)
(Mason & Asher, 1973).
Organizations Emerging from the Bretton Woods Conference
The IMF
The IMF provides financial assistance to countries experi-
encing severe financial difficulties. In turn, it requires members'
currencies to be exchanged freely for foreign currencies, to
inform the IMF of planned changes in financial and monetary
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policies, and to modify their economic policies based on the
IMF advice. Although the IMF administers an emergency
lending pool, they are not primarily a lending institution like
the World Bank (WB). The IMF perspective is based on the
view that international prosperity is rooted in an orderly mon-
etary system that encourages free trade, creates jobs, expands
economic activity and raises global living standards (Driscoll,
1996).
Member nations requesting loans and/or organizational
consultation are often required to conform to the "Washington
Consensus," a set of fiscal reforms developed by neoliberal
economists. The name was chosen because it represents the
shared themes of Washington-based institutions like the IMF,
the WB and U.S. Treasury Department. Consensus principles
include:
ePressuring least developed countries (LDCs) to
enact fiscal discipline; tax reforms; market-driven
interest rates; currency exchange rates based on
market conditions; and strict oversight of financial
institutions.
* Coercing borrower nations to adopt aggressive free
trade policies by removing import restrictions and
tariffs, except for those justified on safety, environmental
or consumer protection grounds. Institute legal
guarantees of property rights.
*Pressuring borrowers to privatize state-owned or
controlled enterprises (Palast, 2003; World Bank, 2002).
The World Bank
Owned by 184 member countries, the World Bank Group
is composed of two principal institutions: the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the
International Development Association (IDA). The IBRD
focuses on middle income and creditworthy poor countries,
while the IDA focuses on the poorest countries. Together, these
two organizations provide low-interest loans and interest-
free credit and grants to poor countries for education, health,
infrastructure, communications, etc. WB affiliates include
the International Finance Corporation (IFC); the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency; and the International Centre
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for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The WB is
responsible for providing financial advice to LDCs for eco-
nomic development and poverty reduction. Headquartered in
Washington it has local offices in 100 member nations (World
Bank, 2006a &2006b; Driscoll, 1996).
Since 1996 the WB has focused on combating corruption in
developing nations - it views reduced corruption and improved
governance as crucial prerequisites for sustainable develop-
ment and poverty reduction (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi,
2005). Over the last few years, the WB steadily moved its focus
from economic growth to poverty reduction, supporting small
scale local enterprises. Despite this new emphasis, WB projects
are frequently criticized for social damage and for not meeting
the goal of poverty reduction (Palast, 2003).
As a lender of foreign currency, the WB demands to be
repaid in the same currency. To repay loans, borrowers must
become net exporters, a goal also shared by rich countries. In
turn, this generates a "transfer problem" - the only way to
repay loans is to engage in other loans and to accumulate even
more debt. During the 1990s this cycle of indebtedness resulted
in a net yearly transfer of $1.7 billion from poor to rich nations
(Caulfield, 1996).
The Proponents of International Finance Organizations
Supporters of international financial organizations argue
that their central purpose is to promote economic and social
progress by raising productivity. They maintain that the WB
and IMF are two of the most highly regarded financial institu-
tions in developmental economics, and that while economic
stability is a precursor to democracy, the WB and IMF have
little power to democratize sovereign states. That view may
be widely shared. A Pew Research Center study found that
more than 60% of Asians and 70% of Africans felt the IMF and
the WB had a positive effect on their countries (Pew Research
Center, 2002; World Bank, 2005). Proponents also argue that
no nation is forced to borrow their money, and that loans are
given at below market interest rates to countries with little or
no access to international capital markets (Mallaby, 2004).
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The Critics
Critics charge that IMF and WB policymakers support mil-
itary dictatorships friendly to U.S. and European corporations.
The organizations are accused of being a U.S. tool for impos-
ing economic policies that primarily benefit Western interests.
Critics claim that the IMF is apathetic towards democracy,
human rights, and labor rights. In Confessions of an Economic
Hit Man, John Perkins (2004) casts the WB as an instrument of
American imperial policy, providing loans to developing coun-
tries for projects that benefit a bribed ruling elite and American
companies. While the WB insists that fighting poverty is their
first priority, many critics, including Joseph Stiglitz, former
Senior VP and Chief Economist of the WB, believe it is respon-
sible for the rising poverty rate globally (Stiglitz, 2000).
Other critics charge that financial aid is bound to condi-
tionalities, including neoliberal-based Structural Adjustment
Programs (SAP) modeled on the Washington Consensus
(Dreher, 2004). For more than two decades, the WB imposed
stringent SAPs on recipient countries, forcing them to adopt
reforms such as deregulating capital markets; downsizing
public social welfare programs; massive privatization of state
companies, water supplies and public pensions; and levying
cost-sharing user fees for public schools and hospitals (Palast,
2003). Even some conservatives believe the economic reform
policies of the WB and IMF is harmful to economic develop-
ment if implemented too quickly, as in "shock therapy." (Public
Broadcasting System, 2005).
The Failure of Other Actors to Reduce Poverty
Myriad agencies glut the field of international poverty
and development. The lines between Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs), governmental organizations, private
donors, and others are often vague and artificial. A caveat is
necessary before beginning this section: Any typology, includ-
ing this one, is necessarily incomplete.
NGOs
The term NGO encompasses a wide variety of groups
and organizations. The World Bank defines NGOs as "private
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organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote
the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide
basic social services, or undertake community development"
(Galena, 1995). (INGOs refers to international NGOs.) NGOs
depend in large part on charitable donations and voluntary
service. They also encompass organizations including corpo-
rate-funded think tanks, community grassroots activists, de-
velopment organizations, and emergency humanitarian relief.
The NGO sector in developing countries has experienced
phenomenal growth and it is estimated that more than 15% of
total overseas aid ($8 billion) is channeled through them. The
WB estimates that there are 6,000 to 30,000 national NGOs in
developing countries alone; community-based organizations
number in the hundreds of thousands (Galena, 1995).
Some government officials established their own NGOs to
access resources and develop new opportunities. Other NGOs
are "briefcase companies" for the purpose of tax evasion and
private gain. There is little consistency in the mission of indi-
vidual NGOs.
Although NGOs have made the lives of millions appre-
ciably better, they have also been criticized on many levels.
Criticisms range from pointing out that only a small percent-
age of aid actually goes to those in need partly due to high ex-
ecutive salaries and other costs. In some cases, NGOs do more
harm than good. For example, many food aid groups that bring
in free food into non-emergency situations from rich countries
undercut local producers and hurt local farmers. Other organi-
zations working on population-related issues have misconcep-
tions about over-population, or misunderstand the family and
community structures in societies where they work. A signifi-
cant amount of aid raised and distributed by NGOs is based
on foreign policy or religious objectives. In other words, the
decisions are made based on the interests of the lenders rather
than the recipients. Aid can often lead to dependency and runs
counter to promoting self-reliance and self-sufficiency.
Regions with high aid levels-sub-Saharan Africa, Central
and South America, and some Central European republics
-have not experienced a significant drop in poverty despite
years of economic aid. The economic growth that some Asian
nations--China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South
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Korea-are experiencing is related more to market forces than
NGO aid projects. The scorecard for success in heavily NGO-
inhabited areas is clearly not convincing. While the reasons for
intractable poverty are complex and cannot be blamed solely
on NGOs, it is also true that their impact on aggregate poverty
is minimal.
National, State and Local Governments
Market liberals often blame development failures on politi-
cal corruption. However, the reality of domination and imposi-
tion in the development field has led to a widespread resistance
to global capitalism. It is not surprising that when autonomy
is reasserted it results in the election of leftist leaders such as
Venezuela's Hugo Chdvez, Bolivia's Evo Morales, Brazil's Luis
Lula da Silva, and Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega.
The impact of contemporary leftist governments on
poverty is unclear. In 1997 (the year before Chavez's election),
61% of Venezuelans lived beneath the poverty line; by 2005 that
number dropped to 43.7% percent, still unacceptably high for
an oil-rich nation (Weisbrot, 2005). The Bolivian economy grew
at 4% or better for most of the 1990s, per-capita income grew
steadily from 1996, and poverty rates hit near-record lows. By
2005 the economic situation worsened and now about 64% of
Bolivians live in poverty. It is too early to judge Evo Morale's
effect on the Bolivian economy. Under Luis Lula da Silva the
poverty rate in Brazil was about 22% in 2005, lower than when
he took office in 2002. Although some poor nations have expe-
rienced improvement in recent years-sometimes dramatic-
it is hard to unequivocally tie that to governmental policies.
Multinational Corporations
In A Corporate Solution to Global Poverty, George Lodge
and Craig Wilson (2006) argue for the creation of a World
Development Corporation (WDC), a partnership of multi-
national corporations (MNCs), international development
agencies, and NGOs. For Lodge and Wilson, MNCs can have
important benefits for developing countries, including the
capacity to build investment, the propensity for creating a
sound economic structure (including job creation), and the
promise of subsequently reducing poverty levels. Lodge and
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Wilson optimistically believe MNCs can do this profitably and
sustainably.
Despite Lodge and Craig's optimism, the track record
for MNCs is bleak insofar as developing a positive economic
change in developing nations. In contrast, Milton Friedman's
(1970) assessment is more realistic:
He [the CEO] has direct responsibility to his employers.
That responsibility is to ... make as much money as
possible.... Insofar as his actions in accord with his
'social responsibility reduce returns to stockholders,
he is spending their money. Insofar as his actions raise
the price to customers, he is spending the customers'
money. (p. 1)
Although the economic data on how multinationals affect
developing economies is unclear-e.g., supporters claim they
pay higher wages in developing countries than indigenous
businesses-it is clear that they cannot be counted on as a
steadfast development partner. Friedman is correct about the
primary concern of corporations for profit.
Community Development
While there are many attempts at bottom-up develop-
ment, perhaps the most celebrated innovation has been the
much touted success of microcredit. Muhammad Yunus won
the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for founding the Grameen Bank,
whose main purpose is to offer microcredit to the poor in
rural Bangladesh. With 47.5% of its 138 million people living
in poverty, Bangladesh has the highest poverty rate in South
Asia.
At least on the surface, Grameen's microcredit project is
successful. The fact that 97% of Grameen's loan recipients are
women in a country where few women can secure commercial
loans is a major accomplishment. This is especially impres-
sive given the 98% payback rate. Supporters claim that half
of Grameen borrowers (close to 50 million) have risen out of
acute poverty because of their loans.
The Wall Street Journal's Daniel Pearl (murdered in
Pakistan in 2002) and Michael Phillips (2001) revealed in 2001
that Grameen loan repayments were less than what the bank
Community Work in a Global Economy 77
claimed, that at least one quarter of loans were used for con-
sumption, that the bank delays defaults and hides problem
loans, and that Grameen is not subject to serious public or
private supervision. Critics claim the Grameen strategy has
created a debt trap for borrowers who are charged high rates
of interest relative to conventional banks. Opponents further
claim that instead of being self-sufficient, Yunus's first money
came from the United Nations, then the Bangladesh govern-
ment, and finally U.S. foundations. From the 1980s to the
1990s the bank received nearly $150 million in grants. At the
same time, Yunus was accused of borrowing at low interest
rates from governments, and then lending it out at higher rates
(Tucker, 2006). Critics charge that Grameen's tactics suffer
from four flawed assumptions: (1) the poor should be self-em-
ployed rather than wage earners; (2) loans are the main finan-
cial service needed by the poor rather than savings and insur-
ance; (3) credit builds entrepreneurship and management; and
(4) microcredit institutions can be self-sustaining despite evi-
dence that new enterprises in poor areas built on credit alone
rarely emerge from dependency (Tucker, 2006).
Regardless of the criticism, economic data points to
Grameen's modest effect on lowering aggregate poverty rates.
While Bangladesh's economic growth rate is a healthy 5%-due
largely to fish and clothing exports-little mention is made of
Grameen's contribution. According to one study (see Table 1),
Bangladesh remains persistently and acutely poor.
Poverty levels in most poor countries have not significant-
ly declined in sixty years of tinkering by international financial
institutions, NGOs, governmental entities, MNCs, and micro
finance projects like the Grameen Bank. Despite the WB's con-
servative poverty threshold of $1 a day, poverty has increased
in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Central and South America.
There is little to suggest that another 60 years will make a dif-
ference in most persistently poor nations.
There are numerous reasons for the failure of anti-poverty
and development strategies, including the lack of coordination
among actors and the inability of NGOs to effectively commu-
nicate with the people they serve. The dynamics of these issues
will be examined through the lens of a case-study of HIVl/AIDS
prevention in a low-income Nigerian community.
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Table 1. Social Indicators for South Asia
RIR MMR LIFE Poverty Literacy GDP HDI RANK
years % % $
China 30 0.56 71.6 16.6 90.9 5003 0.755 85
Sri Lanka 13 0.92 74.0 7.6 90.4 3778 0.751 93
India 63 5.40 63.3 34.7 61.0 2892 0.602 127
Pakistan 81 5.00 63.0 13.4 48.7 2097 0.527 135
Nepal 61 7.40 61.6 37.7 48.6 1420 0.526 136
B'desh 46 3.80 62.8 36.0 41.1 1770 0.520 139
IMR/MMR=Infant/Maternal Mortality Rate per thousand live births.
Life=Life Expectancy at birth.
Poverty=Measured at below U.S. $1 a day.
Literacy=As a percentage of the total population.
GDP=Gross Domestic Per Capita income in U.S. Dollars.
HDI=United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index.
Rank=In HDI.
Source: India Together (2005). A poor and unhealthy nation. September 25. Retrieved
November 21, 2006, from http://indiatogether.org/2005/sep/hlt-undphdi.htm.
Lessons from AIDS in Nigeria
One issue that reflects the failure of current development
strategies is the HIV/AIDS pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa,
an effort that consumed billions of dollars in ineffective so-
lutions. The influence of the multinational agencies is illus-
trated in the way the Nigerian government became aware of
AIDS and HIV at the beginning of the 1980s but was reluctant
to admit the problem for fear of turning away investors and
tourists. For example, in 1983 and in 1985, the military govern-
ments of Buhari and Babangida were prohibited from forming
AIDS councils for fear of classifying Nigeria as an HIV/AIDS
infected venue. Successive Nigerian military regimes from
1983 to 1999 sidestepped the threat by not addressing it. Based
on similar influences, many African governments responded
to HIV/AIDS with denial, ministerial wrangling and the mis-
allocation of resources. The government of Nigeria was even-
tually forced to reassess this issue despite its resistance. This
was partly due to the potential destruction of an emerging
middle class, the erosion of hard-won economic gains, and the
potential restiveness in military high commands. The major
administrative response to HIV/AIDS in Nigeria began in
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1999 with the development of special committees.
Facing a troubled politico-religious environment around
Muslim/Christian differences, Nigeria has a number of aid
organizations working on development issues. A broad range
of INGOs -APIN, Pathfinder International, Ford Foundation,
BASIC, Society for Family Health (SFH) USAID, the World
Health Organization, UNAIDS, Family Health International,
the World Bank, Caritas International, and others-are active
in Nigerian HIV prevention. The presence of international
partners, especially from the United States, is evident in many
Nigerian communities. These organizations seek to collaborate
with other international partners and the Nigerian government
in forming a national response to HJV/AIDS.
Iyiani's (2005) case study examined HIV/AIDS activities
by Western aid organizations and compared it to the lived re-
alities of people most at risk (sex workers, unemployed street
youth, and married low income families) in a poor migrant
community of Ajegunle in Nigeria's Lagos state. Iyiani found
that INGOs and their client NGOs emphasized Western medical
models of HIV/AIDS for both intervention (e.g., testing and
ARV drugs for management) and prevention through educa-
tion and behavior change. In effect, the AIDS problem was
viewed through the lens of a narrow medical model whereby
infection was primarily caused by the failure to practice safe
sex, and reinforced by traditional cultural beliefs and/or ig-
norance (seen as largely the same thing in Western minds).
Education to promote safe sex was a major strategy involv-
ing a wide range of school programs, radio soap operas, and
the provision of condoms. Failures abounded, especially in
profiteering around condom use and fundamentalist Christian
international donors who stressed sexual abstinence. Since
INGOs provided needed resources, this "preference" amount-
ed to coercion by donor nations, especially the United States.
Investigating the lived reality of people at risk illustrated
how this community viewed their situation and how they dealt
with the epidemic. In contrast to the Western medical assump-
tions, Iyiani's study (2006) found a high degree of knowledge
about the transmission of HIV/AIDS, but also strong feelings of
powerlessness in being able to address it. The reaction of low-
income people was marked by fatalism, poverty, and a general
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sense of powerlessness. Sex workers felt powerless to insist on
safe sex in the face of client demand and were burdened by the
costs of condoms given their crushing poverty. Overwhelmed
by mistrust and fatalism, street youth lived for the moment
and were not receptive to safe sex messages. Even respectable
married couples lived with mistrust between partners where
condom use had an unwelcome and hidden message for both
partners. Under INGO patronage, medical professionals oper-
ated through relatively expensive Western medicine facilities
that went largely unused by local people who resorted more to
traditional cultural healers.
INGOs and their client organizations were operating at the
levels of tertiary (curative) and secondary (behavior change)
prevention, whereas the views of the local at risk people indi-
cated acting at the primary prevention level (social structural
conditions). The failure to address conditions such as poverty
and deprivation helps explain the pandemic nature of HIV/
AIDS in Africa compared to the more affluent West.
Iyiani's (2005) findings identified a process of "talking past
each other" by official aid agencies and those most at risk,
thereby inhibiting effective prevention. The study suggested
that new thinking about multi-sectoral responses with full
community participation is necessary to engage in more effec-
tive preventive action. This approach requires the appropriate
policy response, capacity building, and above all, an empow-
erment-based response. Tembo (2003) came to a similar con-
clusion when studying the interaction and miscommunication
between World Vision and villagers in Malawi. Both studies
contrast the Western patronizing "development" discourse
versus the reality and self-interest of poor aid recipients.
In the Ajegunle study, the first step was to identify the
power resources and strengths of the differing groups. For
the INGOs and NGOs it was fairly straightforward since the
gross inequality in the world distribution of resources gave
them financial resources Nigeria lacked. In turn, they used that
position to dictate their own agendas, omitting primary inter-
vention and instead concentrating on secondary and tertiary
prevention.
A second part of Iyiani's study sought out power resources
in the local Ajegunle community. As a poor community, they
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lacked financial resources and human capital, such as skilled
workers, but they had considerable knowledge capital about
their own circumstances and the realities people faced. The
community also had considerable capital in terms of the cul-
tures and lifestyles of the various ethnic groups in the popu-
lation, the churches, and resources like traditional healers.
Similarly, local organizations ranged from grassroots groups
with considerable relational capital around community links,
to expert groups with INGO links and organizational resourc-
es but few networks of local community accountability (Iyiani,
2006).
These case studies suggest the need to pay attention to
how power operates, to identifying and working through the
power differentials, and especially to empowering local com-
munities if effective development is to take place. Such par-
ticipation has, of course, been a favorite invocation of global
financial organizations which are long on rhetoric but short on
delivery. As Tembo (2003) notes, participation is used in a sim-
plistic populist sense with no consideration of the "politics"
of situations-ranging from international to national and local
politics.
A key issue is to analyze and identify the "power" and
locate its sources and bases. In terms of the four major groups
of stakeholders identified, each has specific power resources.
* International financial organizations have
enormous financial power (capital).
* Aid INGO's have considerable financial and
political capital, and access to human capital that is
useful for development.
* National and regional governance bodies have the
political capital (authority).
* Local communities have social and cultural capital
-the knowledge needed for effective development
and for meeting the felt needs of people.
To undertake an empowerment process in capacity build-
ing, effective action needs to replace "power over" by "power
with." This approach stresses not "giving development" as
in Malawi, nor asking groups to "lift themselves up by their
bootstraps" as in many participatory approaches to poverty.
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Nor does it entail the "talking past" phenomenon of Ajegunle;
instead, it reflects the negotiated interaction of various stake-
holders whose resources are the basis for the negotiated devel-
opment of a shared vision and action plan.
Tembo presents a figure of how under the concept of em-
powerment, the agendas of the external agents and the peo-
ple's "internal agents" are brought together for sustainable
development (Tembo, 2003).
Participation P i Capacity-building 
Sustainable
External ___4 (empowerment) development
interventions
Participation is the mechanism by which people are brought
into the empowerment process. This process needs definition
as relationships realized in action and built through process
and interaction are ongoing and negotiated in an open-ended
process. Outcomes of this process are uncertain and are con-
structed through power relationships rather than a top-down
set plan. The outputs of such an approach at any point in time
are contingent and shift with no final solution-"talking to
each other" is an ongoing dialogue which must change with
changing relationships and challenges.
This type of power does not operate solely on a local level,
but on a range of levels (Lukes, 1974). Specifically, from the
actual community level decision making and delivery to that
of setting the agenda for decisions (interaction of INGO's and
governments) and, ultimately, to the structural conditions sur-
rounding global financial structures. In this way, successes at
the micro level are felt at the global level. Globalization is a
two way process-global forces shape the local and the local
shapes the global. In effect, power is "glocal."
While the agendas of groups like NGOs are inevitable, they
are also changeable. Shannon and Walker (2006) argue that
the process of interaction at the decision level has the poten-
tial to develop the leverage to change differing agendas, and
in the long term, to make a contribution to changing unequal
development in higher level organizations. The key to such
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transformative partnerships must be "talking to each other"
and building relationships through communication in agreed
action at all levels where all the relevant stakeholders are in-
volved (Shannon & Walker 2006; Forschner, Brandsdetter &
Byrne, 2006). Development problems can only be resolved by
acknowledging and working with power differentials. Therein
lies the potential contribution of social work and community
development in the global environment. This form of commu-
nity work has the potential to move beyond the failed activi-
ties of the WB, the IMF and other bodies.
Conclusion
After sixty years of effort and planning, international fi-
nancial organizations, NGOs, national governments, MNCs,
and community development projects have failed to lift large
numbers of people out of poverty. The economic and social
strategies employed by these groups have not resulted in sig-
nificant poverty reduction despite throwing billions of dollars
at the problem. There is little evidence that the top-down ap-
proach of aid, loans and other forms of assistance has made a
major dent in ending the devastating poverty in the develop-
ing world.
Local community initiatives, like microcredit, have also not
significantly lowered aggregate poverty levels. An alternative
strategy would require a multi-tiered approach that gives sig-
nificant decision-making to people at the lowest level. But this
strategy alone will still not significantly decrease the overall
number of people in poverty. What is necessary are multiple
strategies that involve a high level of collaboration and co-
ordination with all organizations involved in the develop-
ment process. Grounded in the active participation of those in
poverty, this kind of coordinated approach will maximize re-
sources, end duplication of services, and carefully target areas
of need. Will it work? There is no magic bullet to end poverty.
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